In this presentation we will introduce Veracruz, a project recently adopted by the Confidential Compute Consortium, exploring how efficient, collaborative computations between mutually distrusting parties can be developed using a mixture of hardware- and software strong isolation mechanisms. Veracruz uses Arm TrustZone, Intel SGX, AWS Nitro Enclaves, or the high-assurance seL4 microvisor, to provide a "neutral ground" within which a collaborative computation takes place, shielded from prying or interference by the host of the computation. The computation itself is realised by a WebAssembly program which sandboxes the computation, means Veracruz programs are portable across different isolation technologies, and allows multi-party computations to be quickly written in high-level programming languages with standard development tools. Potential use-cases for Veracruz include support for privacy-preserving collaborative machine-learning, privacy-preserving surveys, polls, elections, or auctions, and safely delegating computations from weak devices to more powerful devices, amongst many others.