

# FIDO beyond the browser

Joost van Dijk


FOSDEM - 3 Feb 2023

# Overview


- What is FIDO?
- FIDO Security Keys
- Device attestation and the FIDO metadata service
- libfido2
- FIDO2 extensions
- Example use cases:
  - Authentication: pam-u2f, ssh
  - Signing: git commit signing
  - Encryption: LUKS2 disk encryption
  - Storage: SSH certificates

# FIDO2

- Specifications:
  - CTAP - using a FIDO authenticator from a client (e.g. a browser)
  - Webauthn: API for using FIDO credentials in web applications



# CTAP and Webauthn (simplified)



$\text{result} = \text{verify}(p, \text{response}, \text{challenge})$   
**+origin**

$\text{response} = \text{sign}(k, \text{challenge})$   
**+origin**

# FIDO Security Keys: roaming authenticators




yubico

# CTAP: operations (simplified)

uID	credId	pub
jdoe	0xa1b2	0x41...

(RP user store)



Client



Authenticator

credId	uID	rpID	priv
0xa1b2	jdoe	eg.com	0xf1...

(authR credential mapping)

verify(resp, signature)  
store[uID] = {credId, pub}

{credId, pub} = store[uID]

verify(pub, resp, signature)

makeCredential(rpId, uID, cData, ...)

{ credId, pub, signature, ... }

...

getAssertion(credID, rpId, cData, ...)


{ signature, ... }

```
(priv, pub) = genKeyPair()
credId = genCredId(...)
map {credId, uID, rpID} → priv
signature = sign(...)
```

```
priv = lookup {credID}
signature = sign(priv, rpId, cData...)
```


# Attestation and Metadata

- Attestation provides verifiable evidence as to the authenticator's origin
- Based on a hardware attestation key and certificate
- Use FIDO Alliance Metadata Service to determine provenance
- Implement Allow/Deny lists to filter Authenticators
- Typically used in high-assurance (enterprise) use cases



# Metadata example

- `aaguid`  
(Authenticator unique ID)
- `keyProtection`  
e.g. `secure_element`
- `transports`  
e.g. `usb`
- `status`  
(certification level)



The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "FIDO MDS Explorer" with the URL "opotonniee.github.io". The page displays the metadata for a "YubiKey 5 Series with Lightning". The metadata is structured as follows:

- `aaguid`: "c5ef55ff-ad9a-4b9f-b580-adebaf026d0"
- `metadataStatement`:
  - `legalHeader`: "Submission of this statement and retrieval and use of this statement indicates acceptance of the appropriate agreement located at <https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/metadata-legal-terms/>."
  - `aaguid`: "c5ef55ff-ad9a-4b9f-b580-adebaf026d0"
  - `description`: "YubiKey 5 Series with Lightning"
  - `authenticatorVersion`: 328706
  - `protocolFamily`: "fido2"
  - `schema`: 3
  - `upv`:
    1.
      - `major`: 1
      - `minor`: 0
  - `authenticationAlgorithms`:
    1. "ed25519\_eddsa\_sha512\_raw"
    2. "secp256r1\_ecdsa\_sha256\_raw"
  - `publicKeyAlgAndEncodings`:
    1. "cose"
  - `attestationTypes`:
    1. "basic\_full"
  - `userVerificationDetails`:
    1.
      - `userVerificationMethod`: "presence\_internal"
    2.
      - `userVerificationMethod`: "passcode\_internal"
      - `caDesc`:
        - `base`: 64
        - `minLength`: 4
        - `maxRetries`: 8
        - `blockSlowdown`: 0
    3.
      - `userVerificationMethod`: "none"
  - `keyProtection`:
    1. "hardware"



# FIDO Metadata Service

DEMO

- retrieve FIDO metadata JWT:

```
curl -Ls https://mds3.fidoalliance.org/ --output md.jwt
```

- extract certificate chain from JWT header (skipped):

```
[mds.pem, intermediates.pem]
```

- verify certificate chain:

```
openssl verify -CAfile cacerts.pem -untrusted intermediates.pem mds.pem
```

- verify JWT (using [smallstep CLI](#)):

```
cat md.jwt | step crypto jwt verify --key mds.pem --alg RS256 --subtle \  
| jq .payload > md.json
```

- parsing JSON (using [jq](#)):

```
cat md.json | jq -r '.entries[] | select(.aaguid) | .metadataStatement \  
| [.aaguid,.description] | @tsv'
```

- example output:

```
ee882879-721c-4913-9775-3dfc97072a YubiKey 5 Series
```


```
...
```

yubico

# libfido2

- <https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2>
- Library and command-line tools
- Communicate with a FIDO device over USB or NFC
- Supports both FIDO U2F (CTAP 1) and FIDO2 (CTAP 2) protocols
- Works on Linux, macOS, Windows, OpenBSD, and FreeBSD
- Bindings for [.NET](#), [Go](#), [Perl](#), [Rust](#)
- Also available:
  - <https://github.com/Yubico/python-fido2>

# Example: pam-u2f



# pam-u2f

- Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) for U2F and FIDO2
- Require a FIDO credential on a security key when authenticating to a service
- Included in many distributions by default
- See also
  - Code: <https://github.com/Yubico/pam-u2f>
  - Docs: <https://developers.yubico.com/pam-u2f/>

# example: require MFA for sudo

- Install:

```
apt install libpam-u2f
```

- Register a FIDO credential:

```
pamu2fcfg > ~/.config/fido_keys
```


- Configure /etc/pam.d/sudo:

```
@include common-auth  
auth required pam_u2f.so cue authfile=~/.config/fido_keys
```

- Test:

```
$ sudo echo 0k  
[sudo] password for joost:  
Please touch the device.  
0k  
$
```

# SSH keys backed by FIDO Security Keys



# SSH example: generating keys

DEMO

- Generate hardware backed ECDSA SSH key pair:

```
$ ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk -f ./id -N ""
```

Generating public/private ecdsa-sk key pair.

**You may need to touch your authenticator to authorize key generation.**

**Enter PIN for authenticator: \*\*\*\*\***

**You may need to touch your authenticator again to authorize key generation.**

Your identification has been saved in ./id

Your public key has been saved in ./id.pub

The key fingerprint is:

```
SHA256:eG00VlLwvP4rWPMdRYprfQ8F1tmnTQJWGq8WjV97pHk user@machine
```

The key's randomart image is:

...

- Idem, using ED25519:

```
$ ssh-keygen -t ed25519-sk -f ./id2 -N ""
```

yubico

# SSH example: authenticating to GitHub

DEMO

- Register your public key at GitHub:  
<https://github.com/settings/keys>
- Authenticate to a git repo over SSH:  

```
$ git clone git@github.com:user/repo.git  
Cloning into 'repo'...  
Confirm user presence for key ED25519-SK SHA256:FpybChVXHU/...+8x0  
User presence confirmed  
...  
Resolving deltas: 100% (6/6), done.
```

yubico



# SSH example: signing files

- Generate hardware backed SSH key pair:  
`ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk -f ./id1 -N ""`
- Sign (in file namespace):  
`ssh-keygen -Y sign -n file -f ./id1 datafile`  
(generates signature in `datafile.sig`)
- Verify:  
`ssh-keygen -Y verify -n file -s datafile.sig \  
-f ./allowed_signers -I user1@example < datafile`
- Trusted public keys in `allowed_signers`:

```
# user          key type          pubkey  
user1@example  sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNr...3No0g==
```

# Git example: commit signing

- Generate hardware backed SSH key pair:  
`ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk -f ~/.ssh/id1 -N ""`
- Configure git:  
`git config gpg.format ssh`  
`git config user.signingKey ~/.ssh/id1`  
`git config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile ~/.ssh/allowed_signers`
- Sign a commit:  
`git commit -S -m'initial import'`
- Sign a tag:  
`git tag -s v1.0 -m'signed v1.0 tag'`
- Show and verify signatures:  
`git log --oneline --show-signature`



github.com/joostd/test/commits/main



added sk

joostd committed on Sep 10, 2022

Verified



932fcd1



Commits on Sep 6, 2022

test

joostd committed on Sep 6, 2022

Initial commit

joostd committed on Sep 6, 2022



This commit was signed with the committer's **verified signature**.



joostd

Joost van Dijk

SSH Key Fingerprint:

HA/qdrwA7aBstNHDd4zegPTbfympjUq

G7vBpJxS6cLU


[Learn about vigilant mode.](#)

Newer

# hmac-secret extension

- Goal: retrieve a symmetric secret from the authenticator
- On Windows: ensures you can sign-in to your device when it's off-line or in airplane mode
- Part of the secret is held by the client (the salt) and the other part of the secret is attached to the credential on the key.
- Combining the salt and the credential will produce the secret.
- Maintain different secrets on different systems.

# CTAP: hmac-secret (simplified)



Client



Authenticator

makeCredential(..., createSecret=true)

{ ..., createSecret=true }

getAssertion(..., salt)

{..., output }

...  
key = random()  
map {credId,...,key} → priv  
...

...  
output = hmac\_sha256(key, salt)

...  
salt = random()  
store[uID] = {credId, pub, salt}

{credId, pub, salt} = store[uID]

...  
encryption\_key = KDF(output)

# hmac-secret: example

- Generate a resident (-r) FIDO credential with hmac-secret (-h):  
`cred -r -h -k ./pubkey -P myPIN /dev/hidraw1`
- Generate some random salt:  
`cat /dev/urandom | head -c32 > ./salt`
- Generate a secret key using our FIDO credential and our salt:  
`assert -p -h ./secret -s ./salt -P myPIN ./pubkey /dev/hidraw1`
- Some data to encrypt:  
`echo some secret data > plaintext`
- Encrypt our data (*safe to delete secret key and plaintext*)  
`openssl enc -aes256 -e -pass file:./secret \  
-in ./plaintext -out ./ciphertext`
- Decrypt our data (*may need to regenerate secret key first*)  
`openssl enc -aes256 -d -pass file:./secret -in ./ciphertext`

# hmac-secret application: LUKS

- LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup) disk encryption
- systemd v248+ supports unlocking LUKS2 volumes using FIDO2 security keys
- derives the disk decryption key from a FIDO credential using the hmac-secret extension
- Enroll a FIDO2 authenticator to a LUKS2 encrypted volume:  
`systemd-cryptenroll -fido2-device=/dev/hidraw1 /dev/sda1`

# largeBlobs extension

- store arbitrary data associated with credentials
- size ~1KB
- Requires a CTAP 2.1 security key
- Example use: store SSH certificates



# example: store SSH certificates

- store (-S) an SSH certificate as a largeBlob:  
`fido2-token -S -b -n ssh: ./id_ecdsa-cert.pub /dev/hidraw1`
- list (-L) largeBlobs:  
`fido2-token -L -b /dev/hidraw1`
- retrieve (-G) a largeBlob and save it to file:  
`fido2-token -G -b -n ssh: out.blob /dev/hidraw1`
- delete (-D) a largeBlob:  
`fido2-token -D -b -n ssh: /dev/hidraw1`

# Device attestation example: SSH commit

- Prove that the key that signed a file (or git commit, or ...) was backed by a FIDO security key
- Produce an attestation statement when generating keys:

```
ssh-keygen -t "ed25519-sk" -f ./sk -N "" \  
-O write-attestation=attest.bin -O challenge=challengefile
```

- Extract attestation certificate, signature, and data from `attest.bin`
- Verify attestation certificate using FIDO MDS
- Verify attestation signature over data using attestation certificate
- Lookup AAGUID in FIDO MDS to find security key make and model

# Conclusion

- FIDO2 comprises open standards CTAP and Webauthn
- FIDO2 security keys can be used as an alternative to traditional hardware security devices such as smart cards
  - More affordable
  - More user-friendly
  - More privacy-preserving
  - Primarily for authentication, but also for signing and encryption
  - Easy to integrate using Open Source software libraries
- Need help? Reach out!

# Resources

- Developer Program: <https://dev.yubi.co/>
- CTAP 2.1 spec:  
<https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html>
- FIDO dev forum: <https://groups.google.com/a/fidoalliance.org/g/fido-dev>
- libfido2: <https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2>
- FIDO Metadata:
  - <https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/>
  - <https://opotonniee.github.io/fido-mds-explorer/>
- SSH support for security keys:
  - <https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.u2f>
- PAM u2f: <https://github.com/Yubico/pam-u2f>
- LUKS2 and cryptsetup:  
<https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-cryptenroll.html>

# Questions?