

# **ECC in FLOSS**

More curves to the set

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Collabora

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## FOSDEM



### **Presentation Outline**

#### **ECC** overview

ECC standards

Implementations

Newer curves, more standards

Choose your curve







**Elliptic curve** 

An elliptic curve over an odd field is a modular congruency with this odd number:



where  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p$ With the condition that it must **not** have singular points (aka non zero discriminant  $\Delta = 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$ )

What's an elliptic curve?











#### Points on this elliptic curve

The set of points of the elliptic curve is  $E/\mathbb{F}_p \cup \mathcal{O}_E$ .



$$E(\mathbb{F}_p) = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_p^2 : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p} | \Delta \neq 0\}$$
$$\cup \\ \{\mathcal{O}_E\}$$





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#### Cyclic group for crypto

A cyclic subgroup of points over an elliptic curve:

$$\langle G \rangle = \{G, 2G, 3G, \dots, \mathcal{O}_E = nG\}$$

where *n* is the order of the cyclic group. We need a big *n*, and  $n \approx \# E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ , because  $|\langle G \rangle| \approx |E(\mathbb{F}_p)|$ 

$$h=\frac{\#E/\mathbb{F}_p}{n}$$

\* On Discrete Logarithm Problem over finite fields you'll see notation like  $y = g^x$  when in ec you see Q = dP

\*\* Skip torsion points or Isogenies definitions



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- Weiestraß Normal Form (WNF)  $y^2 + a_1xy + a_3y = x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_4x + a_6$





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- ► Double-odd Jacobi quartic curves  $(\mathcal{J})$  $y^2 = (a^2 - 4b)x^4 - 2ax^2 + 1$









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- You can change the curve without changing underlying the field size. This has a huge effect on cryptanalysis and the lifespan on embedded



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Choose your curve



- ▶ IEEE P1363-2000
- ▶ NIST 186-2
- ANSI X9.62-1998<sup>a</sup>
- Certicom Sec1v1 & Sec2v1

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Annex H.2: share curve means share cryptoanalysis



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STILLATION: HERE ROLECAS: THOSE ARE INCOMESSAS: STRAFFORD STRAFFARDS STRA	HOW STANDARDS PROLIFERATE: (SED A/C OMMORRS, OWINGER DIGGONGS, INSTITUT MESSAGING, ETC.)				
	SITUATION: THERE ARE IN COMPETING STANDARDS	IM?! RIDICULOUS! WE NEED TO DEALCOPO ONE UNIVERSI STROARD THAT COVERS EVERYTHIES USE ONSES. HETH!	SITUATION: THERE ARE IS COMPETING STANDARDS		

xkcd 927

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	WRF	Edwards
OpenSSL	$\checkmark\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
libgcrypt (GnuPG)	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
GnuTLS	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Kernel	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
WolfSSL	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
crypto (rust)		$\checkmark$
sequoia (rust)	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
<pre>cryptography (python)</pre>		
elliptic-py	$\checkmark$	
elliptic (javascript)	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
crypto (go)	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$

\* Not pretending to be exhaustive

 $\sqrt{\sqrt{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)}$  and  $E(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})$ 



tor

- torspec: rend-spec-v3<sup>a</sup>
  - onion\_address = base32(PUBKEY | CHECKSUM | VERSION) + ".onion

 $^{\rm a}$  v2: was a 80-bit truncated SHA1 of a 1024 RSA key, onion addresses were 16 characters long Open First



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- ▶ PUBKEY: is the 32 bytes ed25519 master pubkey of the hidden service
- The result is a 56-characters onion address
- The key must not have torsion component (or multiple equivalent onion addresses could map to the same service). This is related with the cofactor.

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Curve25519 & Curve448

• rfc7748: Few primes of the form  $2^c - s$  with << s exist in  $[2^{250}, 2^{521}]$ 

$$\begin{array}{c|c} y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x \\ \hline p & 2^{255} - 19 & 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1 \\ A & 486662 & 156326 \\ h & 8 & 4 \end{array}$$

NIST ► ed25519 & ed448

 $x^2 + y^2 = a + dx^2y^2$ 



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Elliptic from defined by s73 - s78 - definition? - s must believe



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#### ► Why they are good?

Open First Build to avoid potential implementation pitfaills, Immune to timing attacks,





### Double-odd [Jacobi Quartic]

The mapping to a twisted Edwards curve can be used



### Double-odd [Jacobi Quartic]

do255{e,s}  
curve 
$$y^2 = x(x^2 + ax + b)$$
 order  $2r \equiv 2 \pmod{4}$   
Different base field and curves by operation:  
encryption  $p = 2^{255} - 18651$   $(a, b) = (0, -2)$   
sign  $p = 2^{255} - 3957$   $(a, b) = (-1, \frac{1}{2})$   
cofactor 2.

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### Double-odd [Jacobi Quartic]

 do255{e,s}
 curve y<sup>2</sup> = x(x<sup>2</sup> + ax + b) order 2r ≡ 2 (mod 4)
 Different base field and curves by operation: encryption p = 2<sup>255</sup> - 18651 (a, b) = (0, -2) sign p = 2<sup>255</sup> - 3957 (a, b) = (-1, <sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>)
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### ▶ jq255{e,s}

- Another mapping to a Jacobi Quartic:  $y^2 = (a^2 4b)x^4 2ax^2 + 1$
- Coordinates transformations and operations in the maps here they are better
- Even faster operations and shorter signatures





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Lenstra, A. K., & Wesolowski, B. (2015). A random zoo: sloth, unicorn, and trx. Cryptology ePrint Archive.



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A random zoo: sloth, unicorn, and trx
 sloth: *slow*-time hash function



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  - to who every one can contribute to influence its results
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- trx: stream of trustworthy random ec parameters suitable for crypto
  - Everyone can influence and verify
  - But no one can knowingly affect the choices
  - The results cannot be predicted or effectively manipulated
  - Prevent prior cryptanalysis or target malicious choices.



#### Corollary

A random zoo: sloth, unicorn, and trx

"Is a way to fix the small set of elliptic curves currently used, and it allows usage of parameters that are frequently refreshed and that cannot have been scrutinised before"

### FOSDEM ECC in FLOSS

Thanks!

Q & A

