# ECC in FLOSS 

More curves to the set

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Collabora

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FOSDEM

# $\mathrm{C} \mathrm{O}^{\text {collabora }}$ <br> <br> Presentation Outline 

 <br> <br> Presentation Outline}

ECC overview

ECC standards

Implementations

Newer curves, more standards

Choose your curve

Open First

## Elliptic curves



## Elliptic curves

## Elliptic curve

An elliptic curve over an odd field is a modular congruency with this odd number:

$$
y^{2} \equiv x^{3}+a x+b(\bmod p)
$$

where $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{p}$
With the condition that it must not have singular points (aka non zero discriminant $\Delta=4 a^{3}+27 b^{2} \neq 0$ )

## Elliptic curves



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## Points on this elliptic curve

The set of points of the elliptic curve is $E / \mathbb{F}_{p} \cup \mathcal{O}_{E}$.

$$
\begin{gathered}
E\left(\mathbb{F}_{p}\right)= \\
\left\{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{p}^{2}: y^{2}=x^{3}+a x+b(\bmod p) \mid \Delta \neq 0\right\}
\end{gathered}
$$

What's an elliptic curve?

$$
\left\{\mathcal{O}_{E}\right\}
$$

## Elliptic curves

## Cyclic group for crypto

A cyclic subgroup of points over an elliptic curve:

$$
\langle G\rangle=\left\{G, 2 G, 3 G, \ldots, \mathcal{O}_{E}=n G\right\}
$$

where $n$ is the order of the cyclic group. We need a big $n$, and $n \approx \# E\left(\mathbb{F}_{p}\right)$, because $|\langle G\rangle| \approx\left|E\left(\mathbb{F}_{p}\right)\right|$

$$
h=\frac{\# E / \mathbb{F}_{p}}{n}
$$

* On Discrete Logarithm Problem over finite fields you'll see notation like $y=g^{x}$ when in ec you see $Q=d P$


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y^{2}+x y=x^{3}+a x^{2}+b \text { over } \mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}
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- Other field can be used like $\mathbb{F}_{p^{m}}$ but $m$ prime in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$.
- You can change the curve without changing underlying the field size.
This has a huge effect on cryptanalysis and the lifespan on embedded


## $\mathrm{C}=\mathrm{O}^{\text {collabora }}$

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xkcd 927


## Cro ${ }^{\text {collabora }}$

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## Implementations

|  | WRF | Edwards |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| OpenSSL | $\checkmark \checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| libgcrypt (GnuPG) | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| GnuTLS | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| Kernel | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| WolfSSL | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| crypto (rust) |  | $\checkmark$ |
| sequoia (rust) | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| cryptography (python) |  |  |
| elliptic-py | $\checkmark$ |  |
| elliptic (javascript) | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| crypto (go) | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |

* Not pretending to be exhaustive
$\checkmark \checkmark E\left(\mathbb{F}_{p}\right)$ and $E\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)$


## Implementations

$\square$ tor

- torspec: rend-spec-v3a
- onion_address = base32(PUBKEY | CHECKSUM | VERSION) + ".onion
${ }^{a}$ v2: was a 80-bit truncated SHA1 of a 1024 RSA key, onion addresses were 16 characters long Open First


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- The result is a 56 -characters onion address
- The key must not have torsion component (or multiple equivalent onion addresses could map to the same service). This is related with the cofactor.
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- Curve25519 \& Curve448
- rfc7748: Few primes of the form $2^{c}-s$ with $\ll s$ exist in [ $2^{250}, 2^{521}$ ]

| $y^{2}=x^{3}+A x^{2}+x$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $p$ | $2^{255}-19$ | $2^{448}-2^{224}-1$ |
| $A$ | 486662 | 156326 |
| $h$ | 8 | 4 |

## NIST

- ed25519 \& ed448

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## NIST

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- Why they are good?
- Build to avoid potential implementation pitfaills, Immune to timing attacks,



## Double-odd [Jacobi Quartic]

- do255\{e,s\}
- curve $y^{2}=x\left(x^{2}+a x+b\right)$ order $2 r \equiv 2(\bmod 4)$
- Different base field and curves by operation:
encryption $\quad p=2^{255}-18651 \quad(a, b)=(0,-2)$
sign $\quad p=2^{255}-3957 \quad(a, b)=\left(-1, \frac{1}{2}\right)$
- cofactor 2 .
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- jq255\{e,s\}
- Another mapping to a Jacobi Quartic: $y^{2}=\left(a^{2}-4 b\right) x^{4}-2 a x^{2}+1$
- Coordinates transformations and operations in the maps here they are better
- Even faster operations and shorter signatures


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ristretto255, decaf448 and the zoo

- draft-irtf-cfrg-ristretto255-decaf448

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- Decaf is a technique for constructing prime-order groups with non-malleable encodings from non-prime-order elliptic curves.
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- Lenstra, A. K., \& Wesolowski, B. (2015). A random zoo: sloth, unicorn, and trx. Cryptology ePrint Archive.
ristretto255, decaf448 and the zoo
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ristretto255, decaf448 and the zoo

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- trx: stream of trustworthy random ec parameters suitable for crypto
- Everyone can influence and verify
- But no one can knowingly affect the choices
- The results cannot be predicted or effectively manipulated
- Prevent prior cryptanalysis or target malicious choices.


## ristretto255, decaf448 and the zoo

## Corollary

A random zoo: sloth, unicorn, and trx
"Is a way to fix the small set of elliptic curves currently used, and it allows usage of parameters that are frequently refreshed and that cannot have been scrutinised before"

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Thanks!
Q \& A


