BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Pentabarf//Schedule 0.3//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALDESC;VALUE=TEXT:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing devroom X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing devroom X-WR-TIMEZONE;VALUE=TEXT:Europe/Brussels BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:13135@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T100000 DTEND:20220205T100500 SUMMARY:Opening DESCRIPTION:
A brief introduction to the room and to the sessions.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_welcome/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Vasily A. Sartakov":invalid:nomail ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Jo Van Bulck":invalid:nomail ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Fritz Alder":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12484@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T100500 DTEND:20220205T103000 SUMMARY:SGX Enclave Exploit Analysis and Considerations for Defensive SGX Programming DESCRIPTION:Intel SGX provided a mechanism to better isolate user-level software from attackers. However, attackers will still use various methods to attack SGX and user’s Enclaves. And user’s code inside Enclave may also have bugs, which can be leveraged by the attackers. We are from intel SGX SDK team, we have conducted security analysis and pen-test for SGX Enclave (based on SGX SDK) during the past 10+ years. We want to summarize some past exploits we encountered in our daily work and what's the mitigation, hope it can help the Enclave developers to write more secure Enclave code.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_sgx_analysis/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Shunda Zhang":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12623@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T103000 DTEND:20220205T105500 SUMMARY:Gramine Library OS DESCRIPTION:Gramine (formerly called "Graphene") is a lightweight library OS, designed to run a single Linux application in an isolated environment. Currently, Gramine runs on Linux and Intel SGX enclaves on Linux platforms. With Intel SGX support, Gramine can secure a critical application in a hardware-encrypted memory region and protect the application from a malicious system stack with minimal porting effort ("lift and shift" approach).
Several major events happened to the Gramine project in 2021. Gramine changed its name, moved to a new GitHub repository, and joined Confidential Computing Consortium. The first production-ready release of Gramine -- v1.0 -- was published in October 2021. This talk will discuss all these events, as well as the current status of the project and its future plans.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_gramine/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Dmitrii Kuvaiskii":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12714@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T105500 DTEND:20220205T112000 SUMMARY:WebAssembly + Confidential Computing DESCRIPTION:The Enarx project reached a huge milestone: its first official release, featuring WebAssembly runtime. WebAssembly and Confidential Computing are a great match because WebAssembly offers developers a wide range of language choices, it works across silicon architectures, and it provides a sandboxed environment. This presentation will highlight the benefits of WebAssembly to Confidential Computing and showcase some demos.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_enarx/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Nick Vidal":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:13138@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T112000 DTEND:20220205T113500 SUMMARY:Short break DESCRIPTION:Short break.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_break1/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Fritz Alder":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12505@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T113500 DTEND:20220205T120000 SUMMARY:Privacy-preserving video object detection in WebAssembly inside Veracruz DESCRIPTION:Veracruz is a framework for designing and deploying privacy-preserving computations amongst a group of mutually mistrusting individuals. Veracruz uses strong isolation technologies, such as AWS Nitro Enclaves, Arm CCA Realms, and the high-assurance seL4 hypervisor, to provide a safe, neutral ground, within which a sandboxed WebAssembly program executes.Recent enhancements to Veracruz have made it possible to support larger, more complex privacy-preserving computations: we have adopted the WebAssembly System Interface (WASI) as our programming model, which can be used by executing WebAssembly programs to query and modify an efficient in-memory filesystem, for example.In this talk, I will first introduce Veracruz before finally focusing on a real-world use-case for Veracruz, in privacy-preserving video object detection, developed as part of a collaboration between the Veracruz team and IOTEX, a manufacturer of IoT cameras.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_veracruz/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Guilhem Bryant":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12688@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T120000 DTEND:20220205T122500 SUMMARY:Symbolic Validation of SGX enclaves using Guardian DESCRIPTION:The confidentiality and integrity guarantees offered by Intel SGX enclaves can be easily thwarted if the enclave has not been properly designed. Its interface with the untrusted software stack is a perhaps the largest attack surface that adversaries can exploit; unintended interactions with untrusted code can expose the enclave to memory corruption attacks, for instance.
We have proposed a notion, called orderliness, that embodies good practice set out by academic papers and the principles of the Intel SGX SDK’s programming model. It is concerned especially with these interactions between the trusted and untrusted worlds. This notion underpins Guardian: an open-source tool that we have created to help enclave developers check their enclaves are orderly before they are deployed. It automatically validates enclaves and reports violations to our notion of orderliness. These violations help find parts of their code that may need changing – they should usually point to an attack primitive.
We have found some security issues in enclaves that had been extensively vetted by other researchers – one of which was crafted by Intel engineers.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_guardian/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Pedro Antonino":invalid:nomail ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Wojciech Aleksander Woloszyn":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:13137@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T122500 DTEND:20220205T132500 SUMMARY:Lunch break DESCRIPTION:Lunch break
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_lunch/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Fritz Alder":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12720@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T132500 DTEND:20220205T135000 SUMMARY:Logging, debugging and error management in Confidential Computing DESCRIPTION:Debugging applications is an important part of the development process. However, error messages and general logging can leak sensitive data, and in some cases even compromise your whole stack, as developers worldwide have recently learned from the log4j vulnerability.
With Confidential Computing, the world gets much more complicated, as every piece of information that a malicious entity on the host (including the host itself!) can gather may be leaking vital information about your workload. This talk details some of the problems that arise, and discusses some options to address them whilst considering real life workloads and application lifecycles.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_logging/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Mike Bursell":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12563@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T135000 DTEND:20220205T141500 SUMMARY:Secure boot, TEEs, different OSes and more DESCRIPTION:In this talk Marta is going to present a map of the trusted computinglandscape, explaining different types hardware support. She is goingto put it in a context of implementing secure boot and trusted executionin an embedded distribution, namely Yocto-based Eclipse Oniro project.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_oniro/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Marta Rybczynska":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12561@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T141500 DTEND:20220205T144000 SUMMARY:Arm CCA enablement through the Trusted Firmware community project DESCRIPTION:The Arm Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA) is an extension of the Armv9 architecture designed to provide confidential computing in standardised and scalable way. CCA builds on existing principles built for TrustZone and virtualization to create a scalable and secure solution. CCA places requirements on hardware and firmware, which together provide the trusted computing base for a new class of secure execution environment that we call a Realm. Trusted Firmware is the key community project that provides a reference implementation of open source Secure firmware for Arm-based processors. This talk briefly introduce Arm CCA and illustrate how Arm plans to develop and enable it in the open by leveraging the community effort that drives Trusted Firmware as open-source project.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_arm_cca/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Charles Garcia-Tobin":invalid:nomail ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Matteo Carlini":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:13136@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T144000 DTEND:20220205T145500 SUMMARY:Short break DESCRIPTION:Short break.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_break2/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Fritz Alder":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12721@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T145500 DTEND:20220205T152000 SUMMARY:Rethinking the OS for Isolation Flexibility with FlexOS DESCRIPTION:Operating Systems (OSes) have historically been classified according to their isolation properties: monolithic OSes, microkernels, single-address-space OSes, or unikernels... Decades of experience in research and industry showed that there is no silver bullet and that different use-cases might demand different approaches to optimize safety and performance.
What if we tried to design an operating system able to be easily reconfigured into any of these points in the OS design space? What if the OS could be a microkernel, a unikernel, or a monolithic OS, at will, and using a wide range of hardware- and software-backed isolation mechanisms?
In this talk, we will present FlexOS, the result of our recent research work in trying to answer this question. FlexOS is an OS allowing users to easily specialize the safety and isolation strategy of an OS at compilation/deployment time, instead of design time. Depending on the configuration, the same FlexOS code can mimic a microkernel with multiple address-spaces, a single-address-space OS with Intel MPK compartments, or many other OS isolation approaches. We have implemented a prototype of FlexOS on top of Unikraft, a popular library OS framework.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_flexos/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Hugo Lefeuvre":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12767@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T152000 DTEND:20220205T154500 SUMMARY:Intravisor -- a hypervisor for fine-grained isolation using CHERI DESCRIPTION:Hardware and container virtualisations are the fundamental technologies of modern cloud stacks. While these technologies virtualise different layers of software and hardware, they have one common thing: they are quite inefficient in terms of communication between isolated entities. The isolation relies on MMU and involves a privileged intermediary, which leads to heavy transitions or sharing data at the page granularity. The escape from this trap we see in the hardware capabilities introduced in CHERI. The CHERI architecture efficiently combines hardware memory capabilities with conventional MMU architectures. It gives not only safety to memory pointers, but also provides lightweight isolation mechanisms.
In this talk, I will present Introvisor, a lightweight hypervisor for microservices. It uses CHERI capabilities for isolation and data sharing, does not require software porting thus compatible with existing software, and provides strong security guarantees.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_intravisor/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Vasily A. Sartakov":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12793@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T154500 DTEND:20220205T161000 SUMMARY:Developing for the AWS Nitro Enclave Platform DESCRIPTION:Intel, AMD, ARM, all have launched their own TEE. Amazon can be added to that list with AWS Nitro, but unlike the others it is not a hardware manufacturer. Instead, it chooses to provides its own abstractions over the platform used. This leads to some interesting characteristics.The Enclave Development Platform (EDP) is a TEE platform SDK developed by Fortanix. EDP already targeted the Intel SGX platform. Recently we also support the AWS Nitro platform. In this talk we discuss the AWS Nitro platform in detail and interesting design decisions we made for the EDP platform.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_edp_nitro/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Raoul Strackx":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:13139@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T161000 DTEND:20220205T163000 SUMMARY:Short break DESCRIPTION:Short break.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_break3/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Fritz Alder":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT METHOD:PUBLISH UID:12369@FOSDEM22@fosdem.org TZID:Europe-Brussels DTSTART:20220205T163000 DTEND:20220205T173000 SUMMARY:Process-based abstractions for VM-based environments DESCRIPTION:Inaugural secure enclave platforms operate at the single user process level (e.g. SGX), meaning a single address space with potentially multiple threads, with a standard OS outside the enclave responsible for resource management and scheduling. More recent platforms (AMD SEV, Intel TDX, AWS Nitro Enclaves) operate at the VM level. This provides significant new capabilities for multi-process abstractions such as mmap and fork, which will be beneficial for enclavizing legacy software.
However, taking a VM image and running it in an enclave is not great from a TCB minimization standpoint. For platforms where there's currently no alternative (AMD, AWS), how can we build--with a minimal TCB--an abstraction that's similar to single-process enclaves? Of course you can “just run Linux” with a single process but this again is clearly suboptimal. We'll explore the solution space in this interactive session.
CLASS:PUBLIC STATUS:CONFIRMED CATEGORIES:Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing URL:https:/fosdem.org/2022/schedule/2022/schedule/event/tee_discussion/ LOCATION:D.trusted-hardware ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Marta Rybczynska":invalid:nomail ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Vasily A. Sartakov":invalid:nomail ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Mike Bursell":invalid:nomail ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Jo Van Bulck":invalid:nomail ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Jethro G. Beekman":invalid:nomail ATTENDEE;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;CN="Hugo Lefeuvre":invalid:nomail END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR