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DNSSEC for security and performance

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Outline

- DNS performance
- Random subdomain attack
- DNSSEC aggressive cache
- How it helps



DNS performance under stress

- Heavy over-provisioning
- Normal traffic \rightarrow not interesting
 - caches
- DDoS \rightarrow consumes everything
 - various types
 - "resilient", not "guaranteed"
 - costs defender vs. attacker

CZ.

Security & performance

"Security" usually slows things down

CZ.

- Higher resource consumption
 => easier to DDoS
- Not always!

Random subdomain attack

Queries

 $\begin{array}{l} \texttt{blah09k23jk234.www.example.com.}\\ \texttt{eek8aomajkejqh.www.example.com.}\\ \texttt{poop992983923c.www.example.com.}\\ \texttt{wtf3-090n32nii.www.example.com.}\\ \rightarrow \texttt{DNS API} \rightarrow \texttt{resolver} \rightarrow \texttt{auth server} \end{array}$

- Easy to execute
- Minimal control of zombie (Javascript, ad, ...)

DNSSEC aggressive cache

- RFC 8198 Aggressive Use of DNSSEC-Validated Cache
- DNSSEC-signed domain with NSEC
- Query names example. ; example2. ; exampleeeee.
- Answer proof of nonexistence status: NXDOMAIN
 everbank. 3600 IN NSEC exchange. ...

DNSSEC vs. random subdomain attack

- **DNSSEC-signed** domains are protected
- No configuration or heuristics needed!
- Sign to get protection against
 - DNS spoofing
 - cache poisoning
 - random subdomain attack



- Validate
 - use modern resolvers

