

Everything you need to know about Containers Security



Track Containers

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@jmortegac







Agenda

- Introduction to containers security
- Linux Containers(LXC)
- Docker Security
- Security pipeline && Container threats
- Tools for auditing container images

Virtualization vs containers




Containers are isolated, but share OS and, where appropriate, bins/libraries



Virtualization vs containers

different kernels/OS single kernel emulation of devices acl+syscall single fs cache many fs caches limits per machine limits per process legacy consolidation service deployment

Security mechanims



Namespaces

- Provides an isolated view of the system where processes cannot see other processes in other containers
- Each container also gets its own network stack.
- A container doesn't get privileged access to the sockets or interfaces of another container.

Cgroups && capabilities

- Cgroups: kernel feature that limits and isolates the resource usage (CPU, memory, network) of a collection of processes.
- Linux Capabilities: divides the privileges of root into distinct units and smaller groups of privileges

Linux Containers(LXC)

LXC

- Lightweight virtual machines
- VMs without the hypervisor
- Kernel namespaces
- Apparmor and SELinux profiles
- Seccomp policies
- Kernel capabilities and Control groups

LXC

- Start single process in container
 - lxc-execute -n container -- /bin/bash
- Whole operating system
 - Mounting filesystems, etc from config file
 - · Application is /bin/init
 - · lxc-start -n container
 - lxc-console -n container
 - lxc-stop -n container


LXC:limit resources


- Cores
 - lxc.cgroup.cpuset.cpus=1,2,3
- CPU share
 - lxc.cgroup.cpu.shares=1024 # default
- Memory usage (!Debian)
 - lxc.cgroup.memory.limit_in_bytes = 256M
 - lxc.cgroup.memory.memsw.limit_in_bytes = 1G
- Disk (blkio)
 - Disk space standard LVM, quota...
 - echo 100 > /cgroup/disk1/blkio.weight # XXX < 1000 !
 - echo "3:0 1048576" > /cgroup/disk1/blkio.throttle.read_bps_device

LXC:limit resources

rootetryit	-talented:~#	tree -m				
	total	used	free	shared	buff/cache	available
Mem:	256	116	69	177	69	69
Swap:	0	0	0			
root@tryit	-talented:~#	1xc exec	first fre	ee -m		
	total	used	free	shared	buff/cache	available
Mem:	256	78	176	177	1	176
Swap:	0	0	0			
root@tryit	-talented:~#	1xc confi	g set first	limits.memor	y 128MB	
root@tryit	-talented:~#	1xc exec	first fre	e -m		
	total	used	free	shared	buff/cache	available
Mem:	128	77	48	177	1	48
Swap:	0	0	0			

Docker





- Kernel Feature
- Groups of Processes
- Control Resource Allocation
 - CPU, CPU Sets
 - Memory
 - Disk
 - Block I/O

- The real magic behind containers
- It creates barriers between processes
- Different Namespaces
 - PID Namespace
 - Net Namespace
 - IPC Namespace
 - MNT Namespace
- Linux Kernel Namespace introduced between kernel 2.6.15 – 2.6.26


- Not a File System
- Not a VHD
- Basically a tar file
- Has a Hierarchy
 - Arbitrary Depth
- Fits into Docker Registry

docker run


lxc-start




Container pipeline



Docker images





Docker security

- Isolation via kernel namespaces
- Aditional layer of security Apparmor, SELinux,
 GRSEC
- Each container gets its own network stack
- Control groups for resources limiting
- Other interesting features...

Docker Content Trust

- We can verify the integrity of the image
- Checksum validation when pulling image from docker hub
- Pulling by digest to enforce consistent

\$ docker pull debian@sha256:a25306f3850e1bd44541976aa7b5fd0a29be

```
[node1] (local) root@192.168.0.28 ~
$ docker pull python
Using default tag: latest
Pull (1 of 1): python:latest@sha256:59d8481f4b2d21f2ac6623e986b4e91fa704
112df3e7d9dddbe7315d4a153ef5
sha256:59d8481f4b2d21f2ac6623e986b4e91fa704112df3e7d9dddbe7315d4a153ef5:
Pulling from library/python
85b1f47fba49: Pull complete
ba6bd283713a: Pull complete
817c8cd48a09: Pull complete
47cc0ed96dc3: Pull complete
4a36819a59dc: Pull complete
db9a0221399f: Pull complete
7a511a7689b6: Pull complete
1223757f6914: Pull complete
Digest: sha256:59d8481f4b2d21f2ac6623e986b4e91fa704112df3e7d9dddbe7315d4
a153ef5
Status: Downloaded newer image for python@sha256:59d8481f4b2d21f2ac6623e
986b4e91fa704112df3e7d9dddbe7315d4a153ef5
Tagging python@sha256:59d8481f4b2d21f2ac6623e986b4e91fa704112df3e7d9dddb
```

\$ export DOCKER CONTENT TRUST=1

```
Isage: docker trust COMMAND
lanage trust on Docker images (experimental)
ptions:
lanagement Commands:
key
            Manage keys for signing Docker images (experimental)
            Manage entities who can sign Docker images (experimental)
signer
ommands:
            Return low-level information about keys and signatures
inspect
revoke
            Remove trust for an image
sign
            Sign an image
            Display detailed information about keys and signatures
view
```

Docker Capabilites

- A capability is a unix action a user can perform
- Goal is to restrict "capabilities"
- Privileged process = all the capabilities!
- Unprivileged process = check individual user capabilities
- Example Capabilities:
 - CAP_CHOWN
 - CAP_NET_RAW

```
[node1] (local) root@192.168.0.13 ~
$ docker run --rm -it python sh -c 'apk add -U libcap; capsh --print'
Unable to find image 'python:latest' locally
latest: Pulling from library/python
85b1f47fba49: Pull complete
ba6bd283713a: Pull complete
817c8cd48a09: Pull complete
47cc0ed96dc3: Pull complete
4a36819a59dc: Pull complete
db9a0221399f: Pull complete
7a511a7689b6: Pull complete
1223757f6914: Pull complete
Digest: sha256:59d8481f4b2d21f2ac6623e986b4e91fa704112df3e7d9dddbe7315d4
a153ef5
Status: Downloaded newer image for python:latest
sh: 1: apk: not found
Current: = cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,cap
_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_setpcap,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_raw,cap_sys_
chroot,cap_mknod,cap_audit_write,cap_setfcap+eip
Bounding set =cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,
cap setgid,cap setuid,cap setpcap,cap net bind service,cap net raw,cap s
```

```
$ docker run -it --cap-drop NET_RAW python sh
Unable to find image 'python:latest' locally
latest: Pulling from library/python
85b1f47fba49: Pull complete
ba6bd283713a: Pull complete
817c8cd48a09: Pull complete
47cc0ed96dc3: Pull complete
4a36819a59dc: Pull complete
db9a0221399f: Pull complete
7a511a7689b6: Pull complete
1223757f6914: Pull complete
Digest: sha256:59d8481f4b2d21f2ac6623e986b4e91fa704112df3e7d9dddbe7315d4a
153ef5
Status: Downloaded newer image for python:latest
# ping 8.8.8.8
ping: Lacking privilege for raw socket.
```

Containers security is about limiting and controlling the attack surface on the kernel.

Least privilege principle

- Do not run processes in a container as root to avoid root access from attackers.
- Enable User-namespace
- Run filesystems as read-only so that attackers can not overwrite data or save malicious scripts to file.
- Cut down the kernel calls that a container can make to reduce the potential attack surface.

Read only containers & volumes

```
latest: Pulling from library/python
85b1f47fba49: Pull complete
ba6bd283713a: Pull complete
817c8cd48a09: Pull complete
47cc0ed96dc3: Pull complete
4a36819a59dc: Pull complete
db9a0221399f: Pull complete
7a511a7689b6: Pull complete
1223757f6914: Pull complete
Digest: sha256:59d8481f4b2d21f2ac6623e986b4e91fa704112df3e7d9dddbe7315d4
a153ef5
Status: Downloaded newer image for python:latest
# touch file
touch: cannot touch 'file': Read-only file system
# exit
[node1] (local) root@192.168.0.28 ~
$ docker run -it -v $(pwd)/secrets:/secrets:ro python sh
# touch /secrets/file
touch: cannot touch '/secrets/file': Read-only file system
```

Seccomp

- Restricts system calls based on a policy
- Block/limit things like:
 - Kernel manipulation (init_module, finit_module, delete_module)
 - Executing mount options
 - Change permissions
 - Change owner and groups

```
$ docker run --rm -it --security-opt seccomp:policy.json alpine sh
Unable to find image 'alpine: latest' locally
latest: Pulling from library/alpine
b56ae66c2937: Pull complete
                                                         2 "defaultAction": "SCMP ACT ALLOW",
Digest: sha256:d6bfc3baf615dc9618209a8d607ba2a8103d9c{
                                                         3 "syscalls":
Status: Downloaded newer image for alpine:latest
                                                         5 "name": "mkdir",
/ # mkdir newdir
                                                         6 "action": "SCMP ACT ERRNO
mkdir: can't create directory 'newdir': Operation not
/ # chown root:root bin
                                                         9 "name": "chmod",
chown: bin: Operation not permitted
                                                         10 "action": "SCMP ACT ERRI
/ # chmod +x /etc/resolv.conf
                                                         11 }.
chmod: /etc/resolv.conf: Operation not permitted
                                                         3 "name": "chown",
                                                         4 "action": "SCMP ACT ERRNO"
```

Docker bench security

- Auditing docker environment and containers
- Open-source tool for running automated tests
- Inspired by the CIS Docker 1.11 benchmark
- Runs against containers currently running on same host
- Checks for AppArmor, read-only volumes, etc...
 https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-securit

Docker bench security

- The host configuration
- The Docker daemon configuration
- The Docker daemon configuration files
- Container images and build files
- Container runtime
- Docker security operations


```
[INFO] 5 - Container Runtime
[PASS] 5.1 - Ensure AppArmor Profile is Enabled
[WARN] 5.2 - Ensure SELinux security options are set, if applicable
[WARN] * No SecurityOptions Found: mypython
[PASS] 5.3 - Ensure Linux Kernel Capabilities are restricted within containers
[PASS] 5.4 - Ensure privileged containers are not used
[PASS] 5.5 - Ensure sensitive host system directories are not mounted on containers
[PASS] 5.6 - Ensure ssh is not run within containers
[PASS] 5.7 - Ensure privileged ports are not mapped within containers
[NOTE] 5.8 - Ensure only needed ports are open on the container
[PASS] 5.9 - Ensure the host's network namespace is not shared
[WARN] 5.10 - Ensure memory usage for container is limited
[WARN] * Container running without memory restrictions: mypython
[WARN] 5.11 - Ensure CPU priority is set appropriately on the container
[WARN] * Container running without CPU restrictions: mypython
[WARN] 5.12 - Ensure the container's root filesystem is mounted as read only
[WARN] * Container running with root FS mounted R/W: mypython
[PASS] 5.13 - Ensure incoming container traffic is binded to a specific host interface
[WARN] 5.14 - Ensure 'on-failure' container restart policy is set to '5'
[WARN] * MaximumRetryCount is not set to 5: mypython
[PASS] 5.15 - Ensure the host's process namespace is not shared
```

Lynis

- https://github.com/CISOfy/lynis-docker
- Lynis is a Linux, Mac and Unix security auditing and system hardening tool that includes a module to audit Dockerfiles.
- lynis audit system
- lynis audit dockerfile <file>

[+] Containers			
- Docker			
- Docker daemon	[RUNNING]		
- Docker info output (warnings)	[4]		
- Containers			
- Total containers	[19]		
- Running containers	[1]		
- Unused containers	[18]		
- File permissions	[OK]		
[+] Security frameworks			
- Checking presence AppArmor	[NOT FOUND]		
- Checking presence SELinux	[NOT FOUND]		
- Checking presence grsecurity	[NOT FOUND]		
- Checking for implemented MAC framework	[NONE]		
[+] Software: file integrity			
- Checking file integrity tools			
- Checking presence integrity tool	[NOT FOUND]		

Security Pipeline





Download from Github



TeamCity

Download from Github



Bamboo

Download from Github



Download from Github



Download from Github



CircleCl

Download from Github



GitLab Cl

Download from Github



Team Services

Download from Github

Container threats

- Kernel Exploits(Dirty Cow exploit)
- Vulnerabilities like the glibc buffer overflow
- SQL injection attacks
- MongoDB and ElasticSearch ransomware attacks


Remember

- Don't run containers as root
- Drop all capabilities and enable only needed
- Enable user namespaces
- Use seccomp for limit syscalls for avoid kernel exploits
- Keep the host kernel updated with last patches
- Mount volumes with read only

Audit Container Images

- You can scan your images for known vulnerabilities
- Find known vulnerable binaries
 - Docker Security Scanning
 - Anchore Cloud
 - Dagda
 - Tenable.io Container Security

Docker security scanning



Docker security scanning






Anchore

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Anchore Open Source Engine

An Open Container Certification Platform





PUBLIC REPOSITORY anchore/cli ☆

Repo Info Tags

Short Description

Anchore Container Image Scanner

Anchore

Full Description

Anchore is a container inspection and analytics platform to enable operators to deploy containers with confidence. The Anchore toolset in this repository provides the ability to inspect, reason about, and evaluate policy against containers present on the local Docker host.

Owner


anchore

Docker Pull Command


docker pull anchore/cli

Anchore

			Vulnerable Package				5
CVE-2017-880			multiarch-su	None	c2b44478417f		https
4		I	pport-2.24-1	1	(jmortegac/l	1	://se
curity- 	l	Į.	1+deb9u1	1	inux_tweet_a	1	track
er.debi 		Į.	L	1	pp:1.0)	1	an.or
g/track 		ĺ	1	1	1	1	er/CV
E-2017- 		1	1	1	1	1	8804
 CVE-2017-880 	High	1	libc6-2.24-1	None	c2b44478417f	None	https



Dagda



Tenable.io container security



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
Tenable.io Web Application Scanning

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








Csysdig "Containers" View



References

- https://docs.docker.com/engine/security
- http://www.oreilly.com/webops-perf/free/files/docker-security.pdf
- http://container-solutions.com/content/uploads/2015/06/15.0
 6.15_DockerCheatSheet_A2.pdf
- Docker Content Trust
 https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/trust/content_trust
- Docker Security Scanning
- https://docs.docker.com/docker-cloud/builds/image-scan
- https://blog.docker.com/2016/04/docker-security
- http://softwaretester.info/docker-audit


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Docker Security

Using Containers Safely in Production



Adrian Mouat



Thanks!

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about.me/jmortegac

