

#### http://www.recompile.se/mandos

Disk encryption is essential for physical computer security, but seldom used due to the trouble of remembering and typing a password at every restart. We describe Mandos, a program which solves this problem, its security model, and the underlying concepts of its design.


Any security system must have a clear view of its intended threat model – i.e. what threats it is actually intended to protect against; the specific choices and tradeoffs made for Mandos will be explained. Another danger of security system design is the risk of its non-use; i.e. that the system will not be used for some real or perceived drawbacks, such as complexity. The deliberate design choices of Mandos, involving low-interaction, "invisible" and automatic features, will be covered.


aptitude install mandos
aptitude install mandos-client

















#### [!!] Partition disks

The installer can guide you through partitioning a disk (using different standard schemes) or, if you prefer, you can do it manually. With guided partitioning you will still have a chance later to review and customise the results.

If you choose guided partitioning for an entire disk, you will next be asked which disk should be used.

Partitioning method:




<Tab> moves between items; <Space> selects; <Enter> activates buttons;

Booting the kernel.

Loading, please wait... Volume group "glorfindel" not found Volume group "glorfindel" not found Enter passphrase to unlock the disk /dev/hda2 (hda2\_crypt): \_

Kernel alive kernel direct mapping tables up to 100000000 @ 8000-d000



## New threat: non-use


## Inconvenient Burdensome "I'll do it some day"




# Security needs to be transparent

#### /boot

#### (rest of disk)







/boot

#### (rest of disk)


Debian GNU∕Linux jessie∕sid glorfindel tty1 glorfindel login: \_

http://www.recompile.se/mandos

#### Servers provide passwords to each other


#### http://www.recompile.se/mandos

#### Normal operation




#### http://www.recompile.se/mandos

#### Normal operation



#### http://www.recompile.se/mandos

#### Lockdown state Administrator attention required




#### http://www.recompile.se/mandos

/boot














#### Client

















## "GPG for data at rest. TLS for data in motion."

If You're Typing The Letters A-E-S Into Your Code, You're Doing It Wrong

http://chargen.matasano.com/chargen/2009/7/22/if-youre-typing-the-letters-a-e-s-into-your-code-youre-doing.html

TLS has a "server" side and a "client" side, and the "server" side <u>needs a key</u>.


#### The TLS key can be a X.509 certificate

#### X.509:

#### "Someone tried to explain public-key-based authentication to aliens. Their universal translators were broken and they had to gesture a lot." — Peter Gutmann


Everything you Never Wanted to Know about PKI but were Forced to Find Out


### Alternatively, the TLS key can be an OpenPGP key





Client


### "GPG for data at rest"?




















## FAQ


## Grabbing the Mandos client key from the /boot partition's initramfs image really quickly?

http://www.recompile.se/mandos

- In Ubuntu "universe" since 2009
- In Debian since 2011

aptitude install mandos
aptitude install mandos-client

## http://www.recompile.se/mandos



http://www.recompile.se/mandos

http://ftp.recompile.se/pub/mandos/misc

http://www.recompile.se/mandos

Disk encryption is essential for physical computer security, but seldom used due to the trouble of remembering and typing a password at every restart. We describe Mandos, a program which solves this problem, its security model, and the underlying concepts of its design.

Any security system must have a clear view of its intended threat model – i.e. what threats it is actually intended to protect against; the specific choices and tradeoffs made for Mandos will be explained. Another danger of security system design is the risk of its non-use; i.e. that the system will not be used for some real or perceived drawbacks, such as complexity. The deliberate design choices of Mandos, involving low-interaction, "invisible" and automatic features, will be covered.

pub 4096R/CA34C2C4 2013-10-05 Key fingerprint = 153A 37F1 0BBA 0435 987F 2C4A 7223 2973 CA34 C2C4 uid Mandos Maintainer Team <mandos@recompile.se>

Introductory text for people to read before the talk starts


http://www.recompile.se/mandos

#### TL;DL

aptitude install mandos
aptitude install mandos-client

If you don't have time to listen to this talk, here is how you install Mandos.

To continue with configuration, read /usr/share/doc/mandosclient/README.Debian.gz



What is the threat model?




Your server




Monster comes




Monster takes your server



#### Now you have no server



#### You and your users are sad




Monster eats your server's data


[!!] Partition disks	
The installer can guide you through partitioning a disk (using different standard schemes) or, if you prefer, you can do it manually. With guided partitioning you will still have a chance late to review and customise the results.	er
If you choose guided partitioning for an entire disk, you will next be asked which disk should be used.	
Partitioning method:	
Guided – use entire disk Puidad – use entire disk and set up LVM <mark>Guided – use entire disk and set up encrypted LVM</mark> Manual	
<go back=""></go>	

### Obvious solution: Use full-disk encryption

Debian installer shown



#### Prompted for password at boot



Data is now encrypted – Monster can still steal your server, but is now burnt by encrypted data


### New threat: non-use

### Inconvenient Burdensome "I'll do it some day"

Mail servers especially common to not be encrypted. Co-location make passwords inconvenient.




Passwords are hard to remember, especially if you seldom use them, like when rebooting a server




Model after IPsec. User behavior can stay unchanged.

boot	
rest of disk)	
$\langle \land \land \rangle$	

- A brief overview of how full disk encryption works.
- The disk is divided into two parts, an encrypted main part, and a small unencrypted part, where the code to run at boot resides.



The code which runs at boot prompts for the password on the display.



The password is typed on the keyboard.



- The password is used to unlock the encrypted part, and the code there is started to run the main system.
- This is the *normal* full disk encryption procedure, and as you can see, it requires some manual work at the keyboard at each boot.

http://www.recompile.se/mandos

Servers provide passwords to each other

What does Mandos do to make this better?

It makes the servers provide the passwords to *each other*.



An unlocked and running server provides the password needed by a locked server when the latter boots.




If the *other* server is up, that server can in turn provide the password for the first one.



- If both servers are down, like when the Monster has taken them, they are both locked – no server can provide the password for the other.
- This deadlock / bootstrap problem is a security feature!
- This is the usual state when you really need encryption.




Let's look at the communication in detail. We call the left computer – the one needing a password – the "client", and reduce the right server to an icon to make room.




The encrypted server's unencrypted part runs code which locates a server on the network, and connects to it.


(Using either Zeroconf to find it automatically on the local network, or by pre-specified IP address and port number.)




The server contains a table of data.




The table is a table of passwords, since the server can serve passwords for many clients.




Since there are many clients, we need some sort of identifier to uniquely identify them to map them to their corresponding key.



The ID is looked up in the table and the correct password is sent to the client.




The password is used to unlock the client's encrypted disk, and it can continue to boot up normally.




Let's look at it in more detail.

The key is sent from the server to the client over the network.




But in the network there be monsters.



There is a good quote and principle to follow in this informative dialogue.

We should therefore use TLS for the clientserver communication.



A fundamental property of TLS is the the server side absolutely needs a key, and the client side key is merely optional. The TLS key can be a X.509 certificate

The X.509 system is most commonly used.


#### X.509:

"Someone tried to explain public-key-based authentication to aliens. Their universal translators were broken and they had to gesture a lot." — Peter Gutmann

Everything you Never Wanted to Know about PKI but were Forced to Find Out


But we really don't want to use X.509 if we don't have to.

There have been multiple security bugs in various TLS implementations resulting from the sheer complexity of the X.509 specification alone.



A seldom-used feature of TLS comes to the rescue.

(RFC 6091: Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication)




There are several things going on here.


- The client has an OpenPGP key, and the fingerprint of that key is used as the ID into the table of passwords. ("FP" means fingerprint)
- The TLS handshake is done "backwards", since the client has an OpenPGP key, but the Mandos server doesn't. So the Mandos client is the TLS server, and vice versa.
- The fingerprint of the client is *proven* by the TLS handshake, i.e. the client does have access to the secret portion of the OpenPGP key, and this can *not* be faked by the client. This means clients cannot ask for any other password than its own.




But what about the other part of that quote?




### What data do we have at rest?




The passwords in the table are unencrypted, i.e. any admin on the server can read them.




Flash of insight: We have an OpenPGP right there in the client; we can encrypt the passwords with *that* key!




Now the passwords are encrypted.




And we can fulfill the other part of the quote.



This is actually the finished design; this is how the Mandos network protocol works.



## Older diagram attempting to show the same thing



Client-side process model with plugins for various input methods, etc.

# FAQ Grabbing the Mandos client key from the /boot partition's initramfs image really quickly?

Threat model: people grabbing servers fast. Sophisticated attackers can and will do coldboot.

Mandos shrinks the window of opportunity to default 5 minutes, customizable

### Mandos

http://www.recompile.se/mandos

- In Ubuntu "universe" since 2009
- In Debian since 2011

aptitude install mandos
aptitude install mandos-client

This is mature, well-used code, and has been available and in use for many years.



The Mandos home page has more information.

### Mandos

http://www.recompile.se/mandos

http://ftp.recompile.se/pub/mandos/misc

Link to these slides (and more)