

# The Avatar project: Improving embedded security with S<sup>2</sup>E, KLEE and Qemu

<http://www.s3.eurecom.fr/tools/avatar/>



Luca Bruno <[lucab@debian.org](mailto:lucab@debian.org)>,  
J. Zaddach, A. Francillon, D. Balzarotti

# About us

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- Eurecom, a consortium of European universities in French riviera
- Security research group
  - 9 people
- Applied system security
  - Embedded systems
  - Networking devices
  - Critical infrastructures



# Outline

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- **Embedded security**
- Avatar overview
- Framework components
- Field testing
- Conclusions

# Software everywhere

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- Embedded devices are **diverse** – but all of them run **software**



# Reasons for embedded security

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- Embedded devices are ubiquitous
  - Even if not visible, your lives depend on them
- Can operate for many years
  - Legacy systems, no (security) updates
- Have **large attack surfaces**
  - Networking, forgotten debug interfaces, etc.
- Sometime too easy to take-over/backdoor



# Challenges in embedded security

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- No source code available
  - Often monolithic binary-only firmwares
- No toolchain available
- No documentation available
- Unique tools (to flash and debug) for each manufacturer

# Wishlist for security evaluation

- Typical PC-security toolbox
  - Advanced debugging **techniques**
    - Tracing
    - Fuzzing
    - Symbolic Execution
    - Tainting
  - Integrated **tools**
    - IDA Pro
    - GDB
    - Netzob



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# Why Avatar

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
- Provide a framework for
  - In-vivo analysis of any kind of device
  - Advanced debugging
  - Easy prototyping
- Integrated workbench
  - To use all techniques together on a live system
- Not only focused on security
  - Debugging/profiling/tracing is hard in embedded environments

# Avatar: basics

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- Emulate embedded devices' firmwares
- Forward peripheral accesses to the device under analysis
- Do NOT attempt to emulate peripherals
  - No documentation
  - Reverse engineering is difficult

# Avatar overview



# Avoid NIH syndrome

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- S<sup>2</sup>E (Qemu+Klee)
  - for emulation and symbolic execution
- GDB and OpenOCD
  - to attach components and devices
- Your own tools for analysis
  - IDA Pro, Capstone, Netzob...

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
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# LLVM under the hood


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- S<sup>2</sup>E combines existing tools to achieve symbolic execution of x86/ARM binary code
  - Qemu translates binary code to an intermediate representation (TCG)
  - QEMU-LLVM translates TCG to LLVM bytecode
  - KLEE executes LLVM bytecode symbolically

# S<sup>2</sup>E in a nutshell



# Python3 framework




# Analysis platform

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- Avatar provides analysis **glue**
  - Orchestrate execution
  - Bridge between emulator ↔ device
  - Intercept/manipulate memory accesses
  - External integration, exposing **GDB** or **JSON** interfaces

# Embedded target



# Target communication

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- Either a debugging interface
  - JTAG
  - Debug Serial Interface
- Or code injection and a communication channel
  - GDB Stub + Serial Port



# Outline



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# Usecases

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- Check for **hidden backdoors** in HDD firmware
- Fuzzing/symbolic execution of **SMS decoding** on feature phone
- **Vulnerabilities check** on programmable wireless sensors



# Bottlenecks

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- Emulated execution is **much slower** than execution on the real device
  - Memory access forwarding through low-bandwidth channel is the bottleneck
  - In one case down to ~10 instr./sec.
- Interrupts are **tricky**, can overwhelm emulation

# Improving performance

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- Point of Interest is often far down in the firmware
  - Trap execution on device and **transfer state** to the emulator
- A large part of forwarded accesses are to non-IO memory
  - **Detect and drop forwarding for non-IO memory regions** (stack, heap and code in the emulator)
- High-periodicity interrupts can be **synthesized** to avoid saturation

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# Limitations

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- State consistency
    - DMA memory changes not tracked
  - Timing consistency
    - Emulated execution time much slower than real execution time
  - Symbolic execution
    - Coherency between HW and SW
  - Bug-finding strategies to be improved
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# Recap

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- Avatar is a tool to
  - Enable dynamic analysis
  - And perform **symbolic execution**
  - On **embedded** devices
  - Where **only binary** code is available

# Questions?

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Thank you for listening!



Thanks to Pascal Sachs and Luka Malisa who built an earlier prototype of the system, and Lucian Cojocar for contributions

# References

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  - [AVATAR: A Framework to Support Dynamic Security Analysis of Embedded Systems' Firmwares](#), Jonas Zaddach, Luca Bruno, Aurelien Francillon, Davide Balzarotti
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  - [S2E: A Platform for In-Vivo Multi-Path Analysis of Software Systems](#), Vitaly Chipounov, Volodymyr Kuznetsov, George Canea
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# Extra: GDB stub

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- GDB can connect to targets using a serial interface and a simple protocol
- There is a stub implementation in the source code tree, but not for ARM and it's bloated (for our purposes)
- 6 primitives are enough to give debugging support with software breakpoints:

Read bytes, write bytes, read registers, write registers, continue and get signal

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